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Abstract 
Extensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL) is an XML-based open 
standard, developed specifically for financial reporting. In wider terms, 
XBRL is a technology by which directed searches and simultaneous 
presentation of related financial statement facilitate, and also footnote 
information could potentially help financial statements’ users. The use of 
search-facilitating technology depletes differences in nonprofessional 
investors’ financial performance judgments and investment decisions created 
by recognition versus disclosure; accordingly, it could not be wrong to 
conclude that search-facilitating technology broadly improves the 
transparency of firm’s financial information. Financial statements in XBRL 
format bring users of financial reports the opportunity that provides them 
with directly search for relevant information regardless of the information’s 
location and to conveniently compare related information among different 
companies. All in all, XBRL can reduce unreliability of financial 
information for firms and help them to minimize the minus effect of 
nondeterministic decisions based upon financial statements’ information. 
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Introduction 
XBRL is a member of the family of languages based on XML (Extensible Markup 
Language), is becoming a standard for the electronic exchange of data between 
businesses on the Internet. Using XML, identifying tags are attached to items of data so 
they can be processed efficiently by computer software. Therefore, XML has gained 
wide acceptance throughout the information technology community as a primary 
method to provide efficient data communication over the Internet (Bergeron,2003). As 
an XML convention, XBRL is easily extensible and can be used across platforms, 
software formats, and/or technologies. These XBRL characteristics allow the complex, 
ever-changing financial reporting process to become more efficient, effective and; 
accordingly, economical. As a result, it is becoming increasingly popular in public 
financial reporting. 
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XBRL is not a software application; also it is not a new accounting standard. XBRL 
is a so-called semantic data format additional to an open and free electronic language 
providing each data element with a tag that identifies it unambiguously. 
The data tags, prepared by XBRL format, provide information about the structure of 
financial data that allows software applications, such as search engines, parsers and so 
forth, to more effectively process the data. As a case in point, software developed to 
search for these predefined data tags allows users to extract and simultaneously view all 
similarly coded information, notwithstanding where the information is presented in a 
firm’s financial statements. This search capability has the potential to contribute to 
increase the transparency of different accounting treatments, decrease users’ costs of 
processing information, and perform as a decision aid for users by facilitating the 
providing related information. 
While search-facilitating technology has implications for numerous financial 
statement issues, recognition versus disclosure of financial information likely is one of 
the subjects which are most affected. In not too distant past, managers have strongly 
opposed standard setters’ proposals to recognize in the financial statements items such 
as stock-based compensation and unrealized gains/losses on financial assets, preferring 
instead that these items be disclosed in the footnotes. One possible explanation for this 
vigorous opposition to recognition is that there exist economic costs accompanied by 
recognition if debt covenants or other contracts are restricted by recognized, but not 
disclosed, amounts. A second explanation is that managers believe that the items in 
question do not meet the FASB1’s relevance and reliability criteria for recognition, and 
thereby deem disclosure the appropriate reporting alternative. A third explanation is that 
managers believe that users fixate on recognized items and discount disclosed items in 
view of processing costs or cognitive limitations. Such a belief would lead managers to 
disclose information they believe would harm firm value if recognized in the body of 
the financial statements. 
Despite the reason mangers oppose recognition in favor of disclosure, the 
implementation of search-facilitating technology has two implications for managers’ 
choice of recognition versus disclosure. First and foremost, by facilitating comparisons 
across companies that differ in their choice of recognition versus disclosure, search- 
facilitating technology makes managers’ choice of recognition versus disclosure more 
transparent to users. Second, search-facilitating technology allows users to conveniently 
access information disclosed in the footnotes and compare and integrate this 
information with related information recognized on the face of the financial statements. 
For both reasons, search-facilitating technology enables financial statement users to 
 
1 Financial Accounting Standard Board  
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make more informed decisions based upon the information contained in the report, 
regardless of where it is presented. 
 
Financial Disclosure 
Early research on the management of corporate financial disclosure has provided 
premises suggesting that managers may provide financial information for different 
reasons. While Gibbins (Gibbins, Richardson  & Waterhouse, 1990) sees disclosures, in 
general, as any deliberate release of financial information, Stoken (Stocken& 
Verrecchia, ,2004)defines disclosure management in terms of the strategic manipulation 
of financial information that the firm's reporting system generates. Therefore, manager’s 
motivations to disclose include, but are not limited to, efforts to enhance their firms’ 
value (Verrecchia, 1983) and attempts to protect proprietary information that may be 
used to their own personal advantage (Dye,  1985). Such disclosures may occur through 
manipulation of financial reports and may be linked to manager’s choices of financial 
reporting systems (Stocken& Verrecchia, ,2004) . Here, financial reporting system 
choices are determinates of the precision of a firm’s set of accounting policies and 
procedures (Stocken& Verrecchia, ,2004). Of course, disclosure is not a substitute for 
proper accounting and may prove to be deceptive (Hake, 2005). Suppose, as an 
instance, that cash basis accounting for the cost of goods sold is misleading, even if 
accrual basis amounts are disclosed in the notes to the financial statements. The notes to 
financial statements generally amplify or explain the items presented in the main body 
of the statements. Also, supplementary information may include details that present a 
different perspective from that of the financial statements. Regardless, financial 
statements are generally accepted as a formalized, structured way of exchanging 
financial information. And, as such, the items on financial statements should meet the 
definition of a basic element in a conceptual framework (Kieso & Weygandt ). They 
should also be measurable with sufficient certainty, and be relevant and reliable. 
A lack of transparency tends toward less useful information that, in turn, may 
produce increased levels of uncertainty among financial statement users. When 
combined with the potential for management manipulation of disclosure information, 
users of financial reports are probably to face increased levels of risk. Hence, while 
antifraud laws, audits, and costly signals may deter false claims (Hughes, 1986), a 
resulting lack of transparency in financial reporting may be problematic to users of the 
information presented in some organizational releases. 
 
Financial Transparency 
Owning to lack of transparency, users of financial data have generally conceived 
that a reliance on current company reporting systems and a focus on earnings have 
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resulted in higher risks in the market as managers attempt to manage earnings (Allen & 
Cote, 2005). Specifically, they are finding that reported quarterly earnings may be 
suspect. As transparency decreases, these and other financial data are not always seen as 
reflecting the long term profitability of a firm. 
As a consequence, those who lack access to financial data and expertise in ferreting 
out financial information tend to be less knowledgeable of the fair value of financial 
instruments (Evans, 2005). Consequently, users are beginning to differentiate between 
companies based on the efficiency with which they communicate shareholder value. In 
response to their realized lack of transparency, they seek detailed information on 
company assets (Phillips, 2000). They also appear ready to reward companies that 
increase the level of transparency associated with their financial reporting (Schipper, 
1989). In doing so, users are expressing a need for information from companies that is 
enhanced and accessible (Harrington, 2005). While firms will tend to respond to these 
expressed requests, organizational attempts to balance internal requests and external 
transparency demands will likely persist (Anil, Glover & Sunder, 2003). On the one 
hand, firms with lower expected earnings may decrease transparency to maintain their 
stock prices (Hunton,  Libby & Mazza, 2006); on the other hand, investors will reward 
higher transparency, aiming to meet the demand of their investors (Hebb , 2006). 
Whereas less transparency is more likely to enable managers to hide accounting 
problems and provide self-interested reporting of their financial data (Fan & Wong, 
2002), greater transparency in reporting formats is more likely to reduce the 
management of earnings(Hunton , Libby & Mazza, 2006) . However, companies 
attempting “to give the market what it wants” will tend to move toward transparency 
and companies with business models that incorporate 
built in inefficiencies are likely to avoid doing so(Phillips, 2000) . 
Recent financial reporting scandals offer support to this position; therefore, 
regulating agencies around the world are moving toward standardization of financial 
reporting. But as international companies look at the different financial reporting 
standards in one country vs. another, the task of presenting shareholder value seems 
daunting if not impossible. International companies will have to adopt reporting 
standards in their accounting software which will allow flexible report writing 
capabilities (Coffin, 2002). Of course, such software is one element of financial 
reporting system choice. 
 
Implication of Recognition versus Disclosure for Users’ Decisions  
and Judgments 
As indicated, there are several possible reasons why recognition and disclosure 
differentially influence users’ judgments and decisions. First of all, managers’ choice of 
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recognition versus disclosure per se can have implications for users’ judgments by 
providing signals about information’s relevance and/or reliability (Bernard & Schipper,  
1994). Second, recognition versus disclosure can affect at least some users’ judgments 
for reasons related to processing costs and cognitive limitations (Bloomfield, 2002 ; 
Hirshleifer & Teoh, , 2002). If managers realize this and choose to exploit it, an 
incentive exists to lobby for or choose disclosure of items they believe investors will 
perceive negatively. The first reason above reflects users’ perceptions of data limitation; 
the second reflects limitations in the users themselves. 
In this current paper, we focus primarily on the second reason, cognitive processing, 
in that it is the most influenced by search-facilitating technology. In order to process 
financial statement information appropriately, users must do some measures: 
1. Realize what information is relevant. 
2. Locate this information in the financial statements. 
3. Evaluate the implications of this information for judgments and decisions, 
both alone and in conjunction with other information. 
With regard to the first two steps, research suggests that users not understanding the 
relevance of footnote information may not access this information. Process-tracing 
research identifies both a directive search strategy, in which individuals search directly 
for specific financial statement items, and a sequential search strategy, in which 
individuals read the financial statements in the order reported (Bouwman,  Frishkoff  & 
Frishkoff , 1987). Financial analysts who use a directive search strategy in an 
experimental forecasting task have both higher historical accuracy at their brokerage 
firm and higher accuracy in the experimental task (Hunton & McEwen, 1997). These 
results are consistent with more knowledgeable financial statement users finding 
relevant information in spite of its placement in the financial statements and less 
knowledgeable users simply reading the information as presented. Since footnotes 
typically are among the last items presented in an annual report, users who use a 
sequential strategy may reach an “overloaded” cognitive state prior to reading the 
footnotes and not access this information. 
Even if users read the footnotes, they may not understand the implications of the 
information, either alone, or along with related information presented elsewhere in the 
financial statements. Research finds that users who do not fully understand a financial 
item use placement within the body of the financial statements as a signal of the nature 
and importance of financial information. As a prototype, nonprofessional investors view 
comprehensive income items as more important for assessing firm performance when 
these items are presented in a performance (income) statement than in a statement of 
stockholders’ equity (Maines & McDaniel, 2000). This research suggests that less-
knowledgeable users may automatically assume that disclosed information is less 
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important than recognized information due to its placement. Additionally, given their 
sequential processing, less-knowledgeable users may have difficulty connecting related 
information dispersed via financial reports and thus fail to integrate footnote 
information with information presented in the body of the financial statements. 
Ultimately, even if users are able to accomplish all three processing steps, they will 
not do so if they expect the cognitive costs of processing footnote information to 
outweigh the benefits. Research indicates that cognitive processing costs influence even 
professional users’ judgments and decisions (Hirst & Hopkins, 1998). Seemingly, 
analysts ignore data that they believe does not provide important information. 
In sum, research indicates that cognitive limitations and processing costs can cause 
investors to place less significance on disclosed items than recognized items for reasons 
unrelated to information relevance or reliability. Research also suggests that less-
knowledgeable users, such as nonprofessional investors, are more probably than 
knowledgeable users, such as financial analysts, to fail to process footnote information 
appropriately. 
 
Xbrl and Search-Facilitating Technology 
XBRL uses predefined data tags that provide information about the content and 
structure of a dataset, allowing search technology to more efficiently and effectively 
categorize and present the information. With knowledge of the labels associated with 
the data tags, users of electronic financial reports can easily extract and custom-format 
information to suit their analyses. For example, in our context of stock option 
compensation, a user can search for “salary expense” and retrieve simultaneously all 
items in the financial statements with that data tag, whether in the body of the 
statements or in the footnotes. Technology that facilitates directed searches potentially 
alleviates cognitive processing costs and limitations that lead to differences in users’ 
judgments and decisions between firms that choose recognition versus disclosure. 
XBRL data tags contribute to the accomplishment of this by providing detailed 
information about the content and structure of the data, providing search engines to 
effectively perform a directed search and simultaneously present related financial 
statement and footnote information. Furthermore, search-facilitating technology can 
overcome users’ knowledge limitations by acting as a decision aid that identifies related 
information and presents it simultaneously, providing users with an opportunity to 
integrate data better and make appropriate comparisons between firms that choose 
recognition versus disclosure. In other words, presenting information in a way that 
enhances the structure of the data and facilitates users linking relevant information 
allows users to more efficiently (and often effectively) acquire and use the information 
(Larkin & Simon, 1987). 
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For a company with outstanding stock options, reported net income is higher when 
the firm chooses to disclose stock option compensation in the footnotes than when the 
firm recognizes stock option compensation on the face of its income statement. We 
expect the difference in reported net income to influence users’ financial performance 
judgments unless they adjust net income for stock option compensation disclosed in the 
footnotes. It is flagrant that search-facilitating technology will decrease the influence of 
recognition versus disclosure by making the firm’s stock option compensation reporting 
choice more transparent and directing attention to the pro forma income statement 
effects of stock option compensation that is disclosed in footnotes. In concise, in the 
presence of search-facilitating technology, users’ financial performance judgments will 
be less influenced by the choice of recognition versus disclosure of stock option 
compensation than in the absence of search-facilitating technology. 
If users’ investment decisions incorporate their financial performance judgments, 
investment decisions should reflect the predictions made in the prior hypothesis. 
Specifically, search-facilitating technology will lead users to be less influenced by 
differences in financial performance (net income) between recognition and disclosure. 
We state the corresponding hypothesis with respect to investment decisions below. 
In the presence of search-facilitating technology, users’ investment decisions will 
be less influenced by the choice of recognition versus disclosure of stock option 
compensation than in the absence of search-facilitating technology. 
Search-facilitating technology may also affect other reasons for a differential user 
reaction to recognition versus disclosure: specifically, reasons related to perceived 
financial statement reliability such as inherent differences in relevance/reliability and 
managers’ use of disclosure to decline negative information. Search-facilitating 
technology probably will make differences in recognition/disclosure policies between 
companies more transparent so that this technology retains placement signals (i.e., 
shows where different information items originate (Hodge, 2001), which XBRL does. 
Thus, search-facilitating technology can draw attention to a firm trying to play down 
stock option compensation by choosing disclosure in the footnotes rather than 
recognition on the income statement. This heightened sensitivity to a firm’s disclosure 
choice will result in users having negative perceptions about the reliability of financial 
statements of firms that choose disclosure. These arguments lead to the following 
hypothesis related to reliability. 
In the presence of search-facilitating technology, users’ judgments of financial 
statement reliability will be more influenced by the choice of recognition versus 
disclosure of stock option compensation than in the absence of search-facilitating 
technology. 
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Proposed Method 
Our experiment is consisted of sixty nonprofessional financial statement users. We 
choose these users as participants in that research suggests that they are more likely to 
be affected by cognitive processing limitations and costs than professional users(Hunton 
& McEwen, 1997) .  Furthermore, nonprofessionals play an important role in the capital 
markets. We randomly assigned participants to one of four conditions in a 2x2 between 
subjects design. In the one hand, the two independent variables are presentation format 
including non-searchable and searchable; on the other hand, placement of data including 
recognition and disclosure. The searchable condition contained a search-facilitating 
engine by XBRL at the bottom of the computer screen that provided participants to 
retrieve all information pertained to a specific account. The non-searchable condition 
contained the same information (financial statements and notes) in a PDF-formatted 
document, which did not have the search engine at the bottom of the screen. We 
manipulated recognition versus disclosure by having one of the two companies 
(Company Y) recognize stock option compensation expense on the face of the income 
statement (recognition condition) or disclose it in the notes (disclosure condition). 
Company X always disclosed stock option compensation expense in the notes. In the 
disclosure condition, where both companies disclosed stock compensation, company Y 
outperformed company X on four key income statement ratios. Given identical financial 
reporting, the difference in key ratios reflected economic differences between the two 
companies. In the recognition condition, where company X disclosed and company Y 
recognized stock option compensation, company X outperformed company Y on the 
four key income statement ratios unless participants adjusted company X’s income 
statement to reflect stock option compensation, i.e., put the two companies on equal 
footing. 
We examine two primary dependent measures: acquisition and investment 
decisions. We capture acquisition by asking participants in the questionnaire to identify 
whether company X and company Y disclosed or recognized stock option compensation 
information. Our acquisition dependent measure is the percentage of participants who 
correctly identify how each company reported stock option compensation information. 
We capture participants’ investment decisions by asking them to allocate an investment 
of $10,000 between company X and company Y. Our investment decision dependent 
measure is the percentage of $10,000 participants invested in company Y. 
 
Experimental Result 
Out of 40 participants who accessed to materials in the XBRL-enabled search 
engine, 21 used the search engine to view footnote information. These 21 users set 
search group in our experiment. Other 19 users who were exposed to the search-
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facilitating technology but selected not to use it, along with 20 users who were not 
exposed to search engine constitute non-search group. Table 1 shows The Effect of 
Search-Facilitating Technology on Users’ Acquisition, and also Table 2 illustrates The 
Effect of Search-Facilitating Technology on Users’ Investment Decisions. 
 
Table 1. Percentage of participants who correctly identified whether company X and 
company Y recognized or disclosed stock option compensation information 
Information’s Placement Participants 
Disclosure Recognition  
Difference(Discl
osure-
Recognition) 
Search group 87% 
 
69% 
  
-18% 
 
Non-search group 94% 
 
43% 
 
-51% 
 
 
Table 2. Mean percentage invested in company Y 
Information’s Placement Participants 
Disclosure Recognition  
Difference(Discl
osure-
Recognition) 
Search group 57% 
 
55% 
  
-2% 
 
Non-search group 67% 
 
34% 
 
-33% 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
Current paper investigates the potential for search-facilitating technology to 
improve nonprofessional investors’ use of financial information in investment decisions, 
using the context of recognition versus disclosure of stock option compensation. We 
find that when stock option accounting varies between two firms, search technology 
contributes users to both acquire and integrate relevant information. Participants who 
used XBRL-facilitating technology were more likely to acquire footnote information, 
and also they were more likely to integrate the footnote information with related 
information on the face of the income statement when making judgments and decisions. 
When compared to participants who did not use search-facilitating technology, 
differences in investment decisions were detected. It can be seen that the 
implementation of XBRL improves the transparency of a firm’s financial statement 
information and managers’ choices for reporting that information. 
Additionally there is a link between search-facilitating technology and managerial 
decisions apropos of financial reporting. Consequently, they predicted that the effect of 
XBRL on users’ decisions may alleviate the benefits of managers lobbying for and 
choosing financial reporting approaches that artificially enhance the financial 
performance or condition of the firm. As XBRL increases the transparency of financial 
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reports in general and managers’ financial reporting system choices and disclosure 
management efforts in particular, the disclosure reputation of firms along with users 
interpretation of the quality of financial information presented will be enhanced. 
Accordingly, as XBRL increases the transparency of management’s financial reporting 
choices and disclosure management to the uses of financial information, the reliability 
and the reputation of their financial information will be more easily analyzed and 
evaluated. As a result, as the adoption of XBRL to support financial reporting process 
becomes more common, managers may become aware that their capital market 
positions are being affected; hence, their attitudes and decisions concerning financial 
reporting system choices and financial disclosure management may change. Provided 
managers conceive that disclosure management may damage firms’ reputation and 
affect users’ investment decision after XBRL adoption, they will become more likely to 
choose more precise or neutral accounting policies and procedures on their financial 
reporting. Alternatively, if managers perceive that XBRL adoption makes their financial 
disclosure management transparent, they will become less likely to engage in financial 
disclosure management that is harmful to the users of financial reports. 
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